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UP THE CREEK AND OUT AT SEA:
THE RESURFACING OF THE PUBLIC RIGHT TO FISH
Dr Warwick Gullett, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong,
wgullett@uow.edu.au
ABSTRACT
The ancient common law public right to fish has had increasing resonance since 2001 when
the High Court in Yarmirr denied the existence of asserted exclusive offshore native title
rights in large part because of the “fundamental inconsistency” between them and the public
right to fish. The Yarmirr decision also established that non-exclusive offshore native title
rights must be consistent with the public right. This creates the potential for litigation where it
is asserted that actions of native title holders have infringed the public right or where
recreational anglers purportedly exercising the public right in an area subject to a native title
determination stray beyond the limits of the right. The public right to fish also continues
despite exclusive indigenous ownership rights over the foreshore (to the low water mark)
where ownership rights exist under legislative land grants. Far from being a matter of mere
historical curiosity, the public right to fish has resurfaced with prominence with respect to its
intersection with indigenous fishing rights. Further, far from being regulated out of existence,
in some jurisdictions the public right to fish has been enshrined in legislation. In NSW it has
even been extended to non-tidal rivers and creeks. This paper examines the content of the
public right to fish and assesses its enduring significance in light of Yarmirr and post-Yarmirr
offshore native title determinations. It argues that the confusion surrounding the interaction
between public and indigenous fishing rights may necessitate Parliamentary action to
allocate access rights vis-a-vis public and indigenous fishers.
Keywords: public right to fish, indigenous fishing rights, offshore native title
INTRODUCTION
Following the famous 1992 Mabo decision 1 in which the High Court of Australia determined
that the common law could recognise and afford protection to native title rights over land, the
scene was set for a future case in which Aboriginal claimants would assert that they had
native title rights in offshore areas. This duly occurred with the Yarmirr litigation which
culminated in a complex High Court decision in 2001. A majority found that offshore native
title rights can exist and be recognised by the common law but they cannot include any
exclusive rights to control access to claim areas. Exclusive rights were denied because they
would be fundamentally inconsistent with the public right to fish and navigate, as well as
Australia’s obligation under international law to allow foreign vessels innocent passage
through the territorial sea. 2 The decision in Yarmirr was applied by the High Court one year
later. In Ward the Court went one step further and determined that the public rights of fishing
and navigation had operated to extinguish any claimed exclusive offshore native title rights. 3
Further, the Court determined that the public right to fish is an “other interest” within the
meaning of s 253 of the Native Title Act 1994 (Cth) and as such it is proper to recognise the
right within native title determinations.
These decisions have been profoundly felt within coastal Aboriginal groups, particularly in
light of the limited recognition and protection of Aboriginal fishing practices within the
various State and Territory fisheries laws. The decisions have shaped subsequent offshore
native title claims by limiting claimants to assert only the existence of non-exclusive rights,
notwithstanding that exclusive rights might exist as a matter of fact within traditional laws.
This paper considers the content of the public right to fish and its impact on non-exclusive
offshore native title rights. It also considers a new area of legal uncertainty arising from the
recent Gumana litigation: 4 the implications of the existence of the public right to fish in areas
subject to land grants under Aboriginal lands rights legislation (where these areas encompass
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rivers or the foreshore). The current state of the law is unclear and unsatisfactory from both
legal and practical perspectives. It is contended that legislative action may be needed to better
delineate rights vis-a-vis indigenous fishers and recreational anglers.
THE PUBLIC RIGHT TO FISH
Origin and nature
The public right to fish is an enduring ancient feature of the common law. The accepted legal
view is that it has been part of the common law of England since 1215 when the Magna Carta
restricted the use of royal prerogative powers. One way it did this was to limit the power of
the King to grant to subjects private fisheries over tidal waters. 5 However, the public right to
fish in tidal waters and the high seas likely predates the Magna Carta in the sense of it having
been an accepted customary practice of the King’s subjects to fish since time immemorial.
The obscure origins of the right lie in its ancient practice. Over time the Crown considered
itself bound to protect the rights of subjects. Therefore, the emergence of the protection
afforded to the public over their fishing practices subsequently founded the legal right. 6
The public right to fish is substantially different in character from fishing rights created under
statute. Whereas fisheries legislation typically regulates the activity of fishing (for example,
the method and time of fishing, who may fish, and the size, quantity and species that may be
caught), the public right scarcely touches on these issues. It does not, for example, include
any measures to ensure stock sustainability. Rather, the right, being based on custom, is
simply that persons may, unless otherwise regulated, fish where and when they like using any
ordinary fishing method. Further, if persons catch free-swimming fish, those fish enter into
their legal possession. The right relates to taking and owning free-swimming fish because
these fish do not belong to anyone. 7 A distinction is drawn between free-swimming fish
(including shellfish) and species that are attached to the seabed. Sedentary species such as
mussels do not fall within the public right because in law they are seen as part of the seabed.
The seabed is considered to be a natural extension of land territory to which proprietary rights
attach. In the case of lands permanently submerged by salt water, proprietary rights are vested
in the Crown. 8 Ownership of the foreshore and riverbeds may be vested in private individuals
or the Crown. As discussed below, there also exists a large variety of rights incidental to the
public right to fish. It is these ancillary rights that have prompted the most litigation. 9
A limit imposed on the public right to fish is that persons exercising the right must have
regard to others exercising the right, as well as persons exercising other public rights. The
main other public right which could lead to dispute is the public right of navigation. Although
in most situations navigation and fishing rights can be conducted concurrently, if there is
conflict the right of navigation prevails. 10
Landward limit
The extent to which the public right to fish can extend landwards is important because in
addition to it determining the upper limit of where the right may be exercised, it also
determines the lowest point at which private land owners can fish exclusively in waters
flowing on their land. For example, Aboriginal people are likely to have exclusive fishing
rights in rivers above the landward limit of the public right if the land under the river is within
a native title determination or a legislative land grant.
The public right to fish is (almost) settled to extend landward as far in rivers as there is tidal
influence. 11 This is because the Magna Carta limited the prerogative power of the Crown only
with respect to the granting of private fishery rights over waters that were “arms of the sea”.
This is necessarily restricted to tidal waters (and arguably confined further to tidal waters that
are also navigable). Above the limit of tidal influence the rights of the water follow the owner
of the solum. The upper limit is the highest point at which the river is affected by the ebb and
flow of normal (rather than exceptional) tides. 12 The debate about whether the public right to
fish is restricted to tidal portions of navigable rivers focuses on the upper limit of the public
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right of navigation which is necessarily restricted to navigable tidal waters. However, it seems
in Australia that the upper limit of the public right to fish does not coincide with this
boundary. In Gumana (No 2), Mansfield J accepted that the position was that the public right
to fish existed in tidal waters “whether those waters are navigable or not”. 13
The public right to fish may exist further upstream than the reach of tidal influence if the
Crown is the owner of the submerged land. This is by virtue of the Crown’s historical
acquiescence in allowing unlicensed persons access to these waters for the purpose of fishing
(and inferred by the existence of inland fishing regulations). 14 This is the view of the New
South Wales Parliament in its note to s 3 in the Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW):
“The public has no common law right to fish in non-tidal waters – the right to fish in
those waters belongs to the owner of the soil under those waters. However, the public
may fish in non-tidal waters if the soil under those waters is Crown land.”
This assumption is also contained in s 38 which extends the public right to fish in New South
Wales up rivers and creeks where the bed of those rivers and creeks are privately owned.
Although the section is silent with respect to beds above tidal influence that are owned by the
Crown, it was assumed by Parliament that the public right continued in waters above them. 15
Walrut goes further and argues that in cases where the Crown has encouraged fisheries
exploitation in non-tidal rivers where the Crown owns the riverbed (such as the Murray
River), then it is bound to protect persons exercising the public right to fish. 16 Even though it
can be assumed the public right exists in non-tidal rivers by Crown acquiescence, because
non-tidal waters are not arms of the sea they are not subject to the qualification on sovereignty
established in the Magna Carta. This means that the right can be overridden in these waters by
land grants pursuant to the prerogative (and not just by legislation).
So, in summary, the public right to fish exists to the ordinary reach of tidal waters, and it
continues (on a different basis) further up rivers where the Crown owns the submerged land.
The situation is different in New South Wales where the right has been extended further
inland by s 38 of the Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW):
“Right to fish in certain inland waters
(1) A person may take fish from waters in a river or creek that are not subject to tidal
influence despite the fact that the bed of those waters is not Crown land if, for the
purpose of taking those fish, the person is in a boat on those waters or is on the bed of
the river or creek.”
Guidance for determining how far this right extends is provided by subsection 38(3):
“In this section, “bed” of a river or creek includes any part of the bed of the river or
creek which is alternatively covered and left bare with an increase or decrease in the
supply of water (other than during floods).”
Significantly, the exercise of the right is limited to persons either being on a boat or on the
bed of a river or creek for the purpose of fishing. This limits the right to the core right of
fishing and precludes the operation of most of the incidental rights (discussed below). Even
though the section defines “bed” in a non-exhaustive manner by the use of the word
“includes”, by construing legislation in accordance with the purpose behind it, it would seem
the correct interpretation is that the upper limit of the right is where a bed can properly be
described as being “alternatively covered and left bare with an increase or decrease in the
supply of water (other than during floods).” This nevertheless means that the right is extended
vast distances up the many rivers and creeks in New South Wales, and through vast areas of
privately owned farmland. This places a potentially significant burden on freehold landowners
in the enjoyment of their land where persons seek to exercise the public right in waters
flowing on their land. This extends to lands acquired by the New South Wales Aboriginal
Land Council under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW). 17
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Seaward limit
The extension seaward of the public right to fish is less clear. There is an argument that the
right extends only to the low water mark because the legal recognition of the right is sourced
in the Magna Carta which limited the exercise of the royal prerogative powers to areas in
which the Crown claimed sovereignty. In 1876 in R v Keyn the British Court of Crown Cases
Reserved apparently determined that the limit of British sovereign territory was the low water
mark. 18 It appeared to follow that the low water mark also provided the geographical limit of
the common law. Therefore, the public right to fish would cease at the low water mark
because the right is an incident of the common law. However, the majority of the High Court
in Yarmirr did not confine the exercise of the common law in this way. 19 Therefore, it can be
stated that the public right to fish in Australia extends beyond the low water mark as far as the
reach of the common law.
Incidental rights
Included with the public right to fish is a large collection of ancillary rights. These pertain to
acts incidental to the exercise of the public right to fish. It is impossible to catalogue the full
range and scope of these incidental rights. In the first place, because they exist at common
law, they are only identified when relevant disputes are resolved by court determinations.
Court decisions only arise when the exercise of a purported right is challenged by an affected
party (in most cases by an aggrieved owner of land adjacent to the water). For example, the
question of whether digging for bait on the foreshore was a right ancillary to the public right
to fish first arose for determination in litigation in 1993. 20 Such determinations are necessarily
confined to their facts. Further, the use of modern fishing practices, both recreational and
commercial, can differ significantly from the practices in question during the old cases. This
is relevant because the right is based on custom, and the customary activities of persons
exercising the right may change over time. Secondly, there has been a dearth of litigation in
the last century on the public right. Most of the litigation occurred during the 1800s, or
earlier, long before the development of detailed fisheries legislation which comprehensively
regulates fishing. This means that because most of the case law on the public right to fish is
very old and occurred in England and other common law jurisdictions, the cases do not have
binding force in Australia. However, they may be determined at some point to have been
received into Australian law. Nevertheless, the cases from other common law jurisdictions
provide a guide as to the legal position in Australia. A review of the cases leads to the
following non-exhaustive list of rights incidental to the public right to fish which are likely to
exist at common law in Australia. The determination of whether a particular activity is a
lawful public right is a question of fact to be determined by asking whether the activity is
ancillary (or otherwise necessarily ancillary), to the public right to fish. 21
Persons exercising the public right to fish may (subject to any legislative restrictions):
•

use any ordinary mode of fishing; 22

•

use as many lines, nets hooks and boats as they please; 23

•

take shellfish on the foreshore; 24

•

dig for bait, and take worms, on the foreshore if they are intended to be used for bait
for fishing (but not for commercial purposes); 25

•

incidentally use the foreshore (such as drawing and drying nets, and landing boats); 26

•

traverse the edge of private land above the high water mark to gain water access at
high tide;

•

temporarily affix nets to the solum underlying the intertidal waters (foreshore); 27

•

pass through the waters of the intertidal zone for the purpose of fishing; 28 and
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•

cross the foreshore in order to exercise the right. 29

The right may also extend to mooring a boat temporarily on the foreshore if this is incidental
to fishing and would not cause damage.
However, the exercise of the public right to fish, and rights ancillary to them, are subject to a
number of qualifications:
•

the exercise of them is subject to any regulations;

•

the exercise of the rights must have due regard to the interests of landowners; 30

•

persons cannot appropriate the foreshore for their own purposes; 31

•

boats may not be left above the high water mark for future use nor may nets be fixed
to the soil above high water mark; and

•

the exercise of the public right to fish must yield to persons exercising the public right
of navigation.

The types of ancillary rights are not closed. Further rights may emerge in future cases. Most
of the cases will continue to arise where the activities of fishers have been disputed by
landowners who own land either to the high water mark or the low water mark.
Legislative curtailment of the public right to fish
Little attention has been given to the public right to fish in Australia. The right has received
judicial consideration in only a handful of Australian cases. Few, if any, disputes between
foreshore owners and persons exercising the right have been litigated, and none have been the
subject of appellate court decisions. Principally this is because there have been (land rights
legislation aside), few land grants to the low water mark. This reduces the prospect for dispute
because landowners cannot assert interference with proprietary rights over the foreshore.
Another reason why the public right has not featured in court cases in Australia is because it
has been continually whittled down by fisheries regulations. It is well established that the
public right to fish is “is freely amenable to abrogation or regulation by a competent
legislature”. 32 There have been legislative restrictions on fishing in Australia from the early
days of limited colonial self-government. People may now fish pursuant to a statutory fishing
right rather than rely on the public right. The view that fisheries legislation severely curtails,
if not abrogates, the right is strongest with respect to commercial fishers who cannot fish
without a licence. It has been argued that statutory fishing rights have replaced public rights.
This reasoning could be extended to recreational anglers who in most Australian jurisdictions
also need to be licensed.
The degree to which the public right to fish, or ancillary rights, have been curtailed by
regulations is to be ascertained on a case by case basis in each location as a matter of statutory
interpretation. This would inevitably produce different results. Abrogation of the public right
to fish might, for example, extend only to the taking of particular species or during a specified
period. The question of what is left of the public right depends on the particular circumstances
in a particular jurisdiction. Notwithstanding various judgments referring to “abrogation” or
commentators referring to the public right as having been “removed” or “substituted” by
fisheries regulations, 33 it is submitted that it is misleading to say fisheries regulations abrogate
the public right, at least in its entirety. This view is based first on the statutory interpretation
rule that a right can only be abrogated with clear intention and secondly because of the nature
of fishing activities. In most cases aspects of the public right to fish would remain. For
example, commercial fishers would rely on the public right when they take fish; this not being
a matter spelled out in legislation. With respect to recreational fishing, each jurisdiction
provides a number of exemptions from paying the licence fee, such as for children and
pensioners. These persons when fishing would be exercising the public right because they do
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not posses statutory fishing licences. Further, most ancillary rights have not been abrogated
(for example, those rights pertaining to the use of land near the water in the act of fishing).
Also, some jurisdictions expressly or impliedly confirm the existence of the right (for
example, New South Wales, Northern Territory, Tasmania, and New Zealand). 34 The public
right cannot be considered to be abrogated if it has been specifically affirmed by Parliament.
Nevertheless, the public right in many aspects of fishing has been curtailed, such as by
regulations specifying the daily take of certain species. But the regulations do not cover the
field. For example, if a jurisdiction has not made regulations with respect to digging for bait
on the foreshore, this activity would be undertaken pursuant to the public right. Many aspects
of the public right to fish remain, particularly with respect to recreational fishing.
Recreational fishing also provides more prospect for disputes with landowners because it
generally occurs closer inshore and is often associated with other recreational activities.
Recent Australian judicial recognition of the public right to fish
The public right to fish in Australia emerged as a minor note in 1975 in New South Wales v
Commonwealth in which two of the seven High Court judges recognised the existence of the
right in tidal waters. 35 It next emerged in 1989 in the High Court case of Harper v Minister
for Sea Fisheries in which Brennan J confirmed the existence of the right but noted that it
does not operate to preserve fisheries from overexploitation. If such a need arises then it is up
to Parliament to act:
“The public right of fishing in tidal waters is not limited by the need to preserve the
capacity of a fishery to sustain itself. The management of a fishery to prevent its
depletion by the public must be provided for, if at all, by statute.” 36
At this point it would seem that the public right to fish has little legal relevance, except that it
still operates to preclude the Crown (but not Parliament) from granting private property rights
with respect to land over which tidal waters flow. However, with the common law’s
recognition of native title since the Mabo decision, the scene was set for a reconsideration of
the public right in the inevitable decision to follow as to whether native title rights exist
offshore. In 2001 this issue made its way to the High Court in the Yarmirr case. A majority of
the High Court found that offshore native title rights can exist (following the Mabo test), but
the key asserted claim of exclusive rights (as can occur in land native title) cannot be
recognised by the common law because of the “fundamental inconsistency” between them
and other existing public rights. As such, the public right to fish was influential in denying the
recognition of exclusive offshore native title rights. A separate issue arises with respect to
indigenous fishing rights founded not upon native title but as an incident of exclusive property
rights granted to Aboriginals under legislative land grants. This is an issue that was by the
Federal Court in 2005 in Gumama. This litigation produced an unhappy result for Aboriginal
claimants and left confusion surrounding the operation of the public right to fish. We will next
consider the two issues of (1) the potential for conflict between persons exercising the public
right to fish and persons exercising non-exclusive offshore native title rights and (2) the
intersection of the public right to fish and exclusive fee simple property rights.
INDIGENOUS FISHING RIGHTS
Indigenous fishing rights fall into three categories. First, specific fishing rights may be
granted to indigenous persons in fisheries legislation. The degree to which traditional
Aboriginal fishing practices have been incorporated into legislation differs markedly across
Australia. It ranges from simply an exemption from paying the recreational fishing fee in New
South Wales to specific approval to hunt otherwise protected species such as dugong and
turtles in Queensland. Such rights are paramount to the public right to fish because they are
sourced in legislation rather than the common law. The two remaining types of indigenous
fishing rights are those that are recognised to exist within native title determinations and those
existing specifically or by implication within an area of legislative Aboriginal land grant over
which water flows. We consider this with respect to tidal rivers and the foreshore.
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Offshore native title
The Yarmirr decision confirmed that native title could extend below the low water mark. 37 At
first sight it seems puzzling that it can be recognised below the low water mark 38 because it is
a “land” right sourced in the doctrine of tenures. 39 A narrow majority in Yarmirr determined
that the common law could recognise native title beyond territorial limits on the basis that the
common law does not stop at this boundary. Further, the Native Title Act 1994 (Cth) is not
expressed to apply only within territorial limits, and it would be inconsistent with the purpose
of the Act to hold that it does. However, unlike terrestrial native title rights, offshore native
title cannot include exclusive rights to control access to claim areas. This means that offshore
native title has little content. The most notable feature of offshore native title is that it
exempts holders from purchasing licences for non-commercial fishing where these are
required by fisheries legislation. Such fishing needs to be conducted within the other limits
imposed by general fisheries regulations. 40
The Federal Court applied Yarmirr in Lardil Peoples v Queensland. The court rejected the
argument that exclusive offshore native title could exist subject to the public rights to fish and
navigate. This was because the claimed exclusive rights were not qualified in this manner in
traditional law. 41 This means that holders of offshore native title cannot exclude anyone,
including people not exercising the public rights of fishing and navigation. 42 Although
offshore native title can extend to the conduct of traditional ceremonies at culturally
significant sites (such as enabling holders to “maintain” places of importance), the exercise of
this right cannot be done in a manner that excludes other people from the area, including
recreational anglers. 43
The litigation to date confirms that the exercise of offshore native title rights must yield to
other rights, including the public right to fish. 44 This issue may arise in litigation if, for
example, recreational anglers stray beyond the limits of the public right, for example, by
utilising land above high water mark (in the absence of necessity) where native title rights
exist. It is a matter of ongoing grievance for Aboriginals that activities that impinge on
traditional practices can be conducted in areas within native title determinations. For example,
non-indigenous recreational take may impact culturally significant species or places. The
issue is even more complex with respect to the rights that inhere in holders of legislative
Aboriginal land grants where these extend to the low water mark.
Legislative land grants to the low water mark
An issue that was not specifically discussed by the High Court in Yarmirr was the extent of
rights pursuant to Aboriginal legislative land grants. Land grants can extend to the low water
mark because this is the extent of the Crown’s territory. This has been done on many
occasions under land rights legislation. The issue was on point in the 2005 Federal Court case
of Gumana. In that case, the applicants, holders of land grants under the Aboriginal Land
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) in part of Blue Mud Bay in Arnhem Land, sought
to establish that they could exclude fishers and others from the intertidal zone and that the
Northern Territory lacks legislative and executive power to issue fishing licences within the
intertidal zone and the adjacent sea within two kilometres of the low water mark.
The late Justice Selway heard the case. It was his view that the traditional owners had the
power to exclude all others from the area within the low water mark (including the waters that
flow over the intertidal zone) pursuant to their rights as landowners in fee simple (the
strongest form of proprietary right). 45 However, Selway J was unable to hold that this was the
case because the matter was not free from judicial authority. He was bound to follow the
decision of the Full Federal Court in Yarmirr. 46 As such, he held that fee simple in the
foreshore “is qualified in that the rights of the applicants do not include rights to exclude
those exercising public rights to fish or navigate”. 47
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A shortcoming of this expression of the law is that it is unclear on what basis the decision is
made. Selway J considered himself bound to follow Yarmirr, yet the judgment in Yarmirr did
not elaborate reasons for its decision on this point. There are two options to explain the
determination that land ownership to the low water mark must yield to public rights. The first
is that land grants strictly pertain to land and have no application to overlying waters. In this
case, the holders of the grant would have no right to stop anyone on the water in the
foreshore, no matter what they were doing there (but it would be a trespass to place anything
on the submerged land, such as an anchor). However, this qualification of proprietary rights
would need to continue into inland waters because there is no legal basis to distinguish river
water and tidal water. 48 This poses great conceptual difficulties with respect to airspace.
Airspace to a reasonable height falls within the exclusive use of landowners. Does this mean
landowners can control access over the land and airspace, but not the water column between
them? Are landowners unable to be control airspace above incoming tidal waters? Can
landowners exclude everyone from the foreshore at low tide, but people may enter while on
the water during an incoming tide? Could landowners build a jetty over the foreshore but
prevent recreational fishers from using it? This option, which involves complex vertical
stratification of landowners’ rights and a possible ever-moving boundary with incoming and
outgoing tides, would create interminable confusion. This leaves the second option: land
ownership includes the right to exclude others from the foreshore except persons exercising
the right to fish or navigate, or ancillary rights. 49 This option is also problematic: landowners
could exclude other persons (such as bathers) from these waters where their activities were
not pursuant to a paramount common law right. Yet the legal basis for this option is suspect.
It involves a legislative proprietary right yielding to fragile common law rights which only
restrict the use of prerogative (not legislative) powers. However, this option better reflects
persons’ legal rights in the sense that people with no legal right to be in the foreshore, such as
bathers, can be excluded by landowners. This option would mean that, for example,
proprietors of the solum could sue passers by who take mussels. This would bring the public
right to the fore and would require elucidation of what activities properly fall within the right,
and what is entailed by having “due regard” to the interests of landowners. People straying
beyond the right would be liable to actions in trespass, and possibly nuisance. 50 It also means
landowners cannot use the foreshore in any manner that would impede the exercise of the
public right to fish. 51 Both options are legally suspect and present practical difficulties.
The lack of clarity surrounding the intersection of the public right to fish and proprietary
rights is significant in terms of the interests at stake and potential litigation. Approximately 80
per cent of the Northern Territory coastline is subject to legislative land grants. 52 These can
extend to the low water mark and be in the form of fee simple. The intertidal zone in northern
Australia covers enormous areas because of large tidal movements. Much of this area is
popular for the recreational fishing sector, as well as commercial fishing.
CONCLUSION
There is great confusion regarding the rights of holders of land grants to the low water mark.
Although we have a ruling in Gumana that their rights are subject to the public right to fish, in
2002 the High Court considered the question of whether holders of fee simple have the right
to control access to the superjacent water but left the question unresolved. 53 The Gumana case
is currently being appealed to the Full Federal Court and there is every prosect of the matter
finding its way to the High Court. If that occurs then we can expect an authoritative ruling on
this point. Selway J’s reasoning in Gumana is compelling from a legal perspective, but it is
unlikely to be welcomed by recreational and commercial inshore fishers. Each of the three
options available to the highest appellate court about the extent of legislative land rights to the
low water mark (1. exclusive; 2. exclusive subject to common law public rights; 3. exclusive
but inapplicable to the water column) have significant ramifications for users of the intertidal
zone. The court will be faced essentially with a policy choice if it decides to read down
property rights. Australian Parliaments have abdicated to the courts the responsibility to
elucidate native title rights, 54 and this is also the case with respect to land grants. The
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inevitable tension that will arise from the final determination in Gumana is likely to demand a
legislative response. Should the High Court affirm Selway J’s judgment, consideration should
be given to legislatively preclude recreational and commercial take from within some areas of
legislative land grants in a manner similar to marine protected areas (for example with respect
to species or places that are especially significant for indigenous communities). However,
should the High Court adopt Selway J’s preferred view, there will be strong calls for
legislation that eliminates the prospect of all recreational and commercial fishers being
excluded from the vast areas of the intertidal zone that are within legislative land grants.
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